96 Anglo-German naval discussions, NCM. (35) 50, para. 7, Cab. 29/148. At a cabinet meeting on 3 May 1939, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Stanhope, declared that “Germany, at this stage, was building ships as quickly as possible, but would not be able to exceed the quota of 35 per cent until 1942 or 1943.”  Chatfield, now Defence Minister, said Hitler had “convinced” himself that the UK had given the UK a “carte blanche” in Eastern Europe in exchange for the deal.  Chamberlain stated that the United Kingdom had never shown such understanding to Germany, and he noted that, when he met the Fuhrer at the Berchtesgaden Summit in September 1938, he had for the first time been aware of Hitler`s faith in such an unspoken agreement.  In a later document to the cabinet, Chatfield stated that “we could say that we understood now that Mr. Hitler had thought in 1935 that we had given him carte blanche in Central and Eastern Europe, in exchange for his acceptance of the 100:35 report, but since we could not accept the correctness of that opinion, it would be better if the 1935 agreements were annulled.”  Part V of the 1919 Treaty of Versaille had severely limited the size and capabilities of the German armed forces. Germany was not allowed to make submarines, naval aviation and only six battleships dilapidated with terror; The total marine armed forces authorized by the Germans were six armored ships with no more than 10,000 tons of eviction, six light cruisers with no more than 6,000 tons of eviction, twelve destroyers of no more than 800 tons of eviction and twelve torpedoes.  British and German naval experts have estimated that the navy will not reach the tonnage limit until 1942 at the earliest.
This was not the case for several reasons, including design problems, insufficient construction space, shortage of skilled labour and lack of resources for raw materials. Germany`s main priorities were the Air Force and the Wehrmacht. Simon was dissatisfied with Ribbentrop`s behaviour and stated that such statements were at odds with normal negotiations before leaving the negotiations. A few days later, on 5 June 1935, the British delegation changed its mind. Simon had discussed things with the British cabinet, who thought the deal might be in their best interest, and Simon was ordered to accept Hitler`s offer while it was still on the table. They feared that Hitler would withdraw his offer and embark on the construction of the German navy, which is much higher than its proposed level. Because of the past, Britain knew that Germany could quickly have the same naval capability as it. Hitler appointed Joachim von Ribbentrop on 27 March 1935 to head the naval delegation. Ribbentrop was the extraordinary representative of the ambassador and president of the organization NSDAP Nomade Ribbentrop. German Foreign Minister Baron Konstantin von Neurath was the first to oppose the agreement. However, he changed his mind after deciding that Britain would not approve the tonnage quota.
The naval pact was signed in London on 18 June 1935, without the British government being consulted with France and Italy or subsequently informing them of the secret agreements that provided that the Germans could build in certain categories more powerful warships than each of the three Western nations at the time.