This agreement has no influence on future agreements between other maritime powers ww2dbaseDelà, it also helped the future Axis power in Japan; With a potentially powerful German navy, the British must now maintain a strong presence in the North Atlantic and therefore be unable to meet the demand for a strong naval presence in their large Pacific colonies of Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. ww2dbase In mid-1935, amid protests by a small group of “alarmists and alarmists” such as Sir John Simon and Winston Churchill, Germany and Britain became involved in the Anglo-German naval agreement. In defiance of all the maritime restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and without consulting France, Britain allowed Germany through this agreement to build a naval force that would not exceed 35% of its own, while agreeing to withdraw the British Royal Navy from the Baltic Sea. This was one of the best examples of the British appeasement policy of the time. To members of the British Parliament, this seemed to maintain Britain`s status as the world`s dominant naval power, but many of them did not realize that Britain had a global empire to defend, while the German fleet would be completely concentrated near its home ports. The agreement allowed Germany to build up to 21 cruisers, 64 destroyers (although it would not build as many surface ships before the invasion of Poland in 1939) and as many submarines as it wanted through incorrect wording or translation of the treaty. Churchill called the treaty an “acme of credulity” and stressed that Britain had “tolerated this unilateral violation of the Treaty [of Versailles].” a) The ratio of 35:100 is a lasting relationship, i.e. the total tonnage of the German fleet must never exceed a percentage of 35 per cent of the total tonnage of the naval forces, as contractually stipulated, of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations or, if there are no contractual restrictions on the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations in the future. Given that the agreement allowed Germany to build more warships than some of the Western countries, the French considered the agreement a betrayal.

They said it was more appeasement towards Hitler, and they believed it would only increase Hitler`s appetite. France considered that Great Britain had no right to absolve the Germans of compliance with the maritime restrictions provided for in the Treaty of Versailles. “Marshal Goering`s threat that Germany could constitute up to 100% of the British fleet under certain circumstances, probably after the end of the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935, is clearly bluff[ emphasis added]. Given the large differences in size between the two navies, this threat could only be perceived if the British construction remained stationary for a considerable period of years while the German tonnage was built on it. That would not happen. Although Germany is undoubtedly able to reach the figure of 35% by 1942 if it so wishes, or even noticeably earlier, it seems unlikely (given its difficulties with raw materials, currencies and the need to give priority to its massive rearmament on land and in the air, and given our own major programme) that it will far exceed that number in the coming years. This is not to say that we do not have every interest in avoiding a denunciation of the Anglo-German agreement of 1935, which would create a current state of uncertainty about Germany`s intentions and the ultimate danger of an attempt at parity with our navy, which must be considered potentially dangerous, since Germany is credited with a naval capacity to build. which is little lower than ours. Indeed, the naval agreement with Her Majesty`s Government is so important that it is difficult to imagine that a general agreement between Britain and Germany, as General Goering believes he wants, would still be possible if the German government terminated the naval agreement.

An assertion by the latter must in all likelihood appear to form part of such a general understanding. Naval experts from Britain and Germany assumed that the Kriegsmarine would not reach tonnage restrictions until 1942 at the earliest. This did not happen for several reasons, including design problems, insufficient shipbuilding space, a shortage of skilled workers, and insufficient resources for raw materials. Germany`s main priorities were the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht. June 18, 2010 marks the 75th anniversary of the German-British Naval Agreement of 1935. Sometimes, perhaps not a date to celebrate, as this turned out to be one of the milestones on the road to appease Nazi Germany before the outbreak of World War II. The Conservative-dominated national government under Baldwin wanted to demonstrate its support for disarmament after the horrors of World War I. Although a bilateral naval agreement with Germany was controversial, he saw it as an important step to bring Germany within the limits of international agreements and limit its military build-up. Nevertheless, Hitler gave British tacit approval to expand the German navy beyond the borders imposed on it by the Treaty of Versailles, and did so unilaterally by his former war allies. .